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The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has recently
decided (i) That the act of that state, (Gen. Stat. Conn.,
§ 2137), which provides that the board of school
Constitutional
visitors of any town may require that every child
Law,
Compulsory shall be vaccinated before being permitted to
Vaccination

attend the public schools, is not in conflict with
Art. I., § i, of the constitution of Connecticut, providing for
equality of rights, or with the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, providing that no state
shall deprive any person of any rights without due process of
law, or deny to him the equal protection of the law; and (2)
That under Gen. Stat. Conn., §§ 2137, 2197, prescribing, the
powers and duties of school visitors, and empowering them
to impose vaccination as one of the conditions of attending
the public schools, the school committee of a town has
authority to pass a vote that every pupil attending the public
schools shall, at the beginning of the school term, present
evidence of vaccination before he shall be allowed to attend
school, and that after the spring term of that year all pupils
not vaccinated shall be excluded, although there was at the
549
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time no case of small-pox in the town, and no epidemic threatened: Bissdll v. Davison, 32 Atl. Rep. 348.
An act which provides for the vaccination of all children
attending the public schools, and for the exclusion of unvaccinated children therefrom, is sufficiently general in its scope,
and is a constitutional exercise of the police power of the
legislature: Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226; S. C., 24 Pac. Rep.
383. So, a regulation of the school board, which excludes
pupils who will not undergo vaccination during the prevalence
of an alarm over the report that there is a case of small-pox
in the city, is not unreasonable. In Duzffedd v. School DisIrict of Williamsport, 162 Pa. 476; S. C., 29 Atl. Rep. 742,
34 W. N. C. 525, the councils of the city of Williamsport
had passed an ordinance in 1872, providing that no pupil
"shall be permitted to attend any public or private school
in said city, without a certificate of a practising physician
that such pupil has been subjected to the process-of vaccination." On the occasion of a small-pox scare, the board
of health of the city sent a communication to the school
authorities, requesting them to take action to the effect
-that no pupil shall attend the schools of this city except
they be vaccinated or furnish a certificate from a physician
The school
:hat such vaccination has been performed."
board accordingly adopted a resolution in conformity with
the recommendation of the board of health, and the plaintiff's son, having neglected to comply with this resolution,
was refused admittance to the public schools. The plaintiff
thereupon brought suit for a mandamus to compel the school
board to admit him; but the application was denied, and
the denial was affirmed by the Supreme Court, which held
that the regulation was a reasonable one; that whether or
not vaccination is an efficient preventive of disease is not a
,question for the courts; and that as there is a difference of
.opinion on the subject among medical authorities, a school
board must decide in the exercise of its discretion whether it
-will or will not, for the protection of the children under its
care, exclude unvaccinated children from the school, and this
discretion will not be interfered with by the courts.
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The Supreme Court of Florida, in Blo.rham v. FloridaCent.
SF. R. R. CO., i7 So. Rep. 902, has lately held, that a suit
Suit against in equity by a railroad company against the state

State
officers charged with the collection of taxes, praying that its lines be declared exempt from taxation under the
laws of the state, that the said officers be restrained from selling any portion of its property for default in payment of taxes
previously assessed, and that they be ordered to repay to the
plaintiff all moneys theretofore improperly collected on account
of said assessments of taxes, is, as to the last prayer for
relief, to all intents and purposes a suit against the state for
the recovery of money, and a judgment or decree against the
officers named as defendants would be a judgment or decree
against the state ; and that that branch of the suit should be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
A suit to enjoin a state officer from assessing or enforcing
a tax for which there is no authority or warrant under the
state laws is not in substance a suit against the state, within
the prohibition of the eleventh amendment:. Sanford v.
Gregg-, 58 Fed. Rep. 620. So, also, a suit against the railroad commissioners of a state, to restrain the enforcement of
their regulations, as unjust and unreasonable, is not, if the state
has no pecuniary interest involved, within the eleventh amendment: Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T71st Co., 154 U. S. 362 ;
S. C., 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Clyde v. Richmond & D. R.
C., 57 Fed. Rep. 436. A suit in equity against the board of
land commissioners of a state, brought by a purchaser of
lands under a statute of that state, in order to restrain the
defendants from doing acts which the bill alleges are in violation of the plaintiff's contract with the state when he purchased the lands, and which are unconstitutional, destructive
of the plaintiff's rights and privileges, and which it is alleged
will work irreparable damage and mischief to his property
rights so acquired, is not a suit against the state: Pennoyer v.
SfcConnaulzy, 14 U. S. I; S. C., i i Sup. Ct. Rep. 699,

affirming 43 Fed. Rep. 196, 338; S. C., 14 Sawvy. 584.
When a corporation, engaged in interstate commence, is
prosecuted by a state board of officers for failure to comply
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with the statutory regulations imposed by the state, the federal
courts may restrain the proceedings, although they were commenced in the name of the state; for the injunction will go
against the board at whose instance the proceedings were had,
and not against the state: State of Louisiana v. Lagarde,
6o Fed. Rep. 186.
When the federal courts have ordered a state officer who
has seized property belonging to a corporation in the hands of
a receiver, in an attempt to collect a tax alleged by the
receiver to be illegal, and attacked by him by proceedings in
the federal courts, the officer is guilty of contempt; and a
proceeding against him for that contempt is in no sense a suit
against the state : In re Tjler, 149 U. S. 164, 191 ; S. C., 13
Sup. Ct. Rep. 785, 793.
When the statute incorporating a board of state officers
provides that the board " may sue and be sued," this is a sufficient consent of the state that the board may be sued ; and
it is not necessary to obtain an express consent before bringing an action against it: Gram ille Co. Bd. of Education v.
State Bd. ofFducation, Io6 N. C. 81 ; S. C., Io S. E. Rep. ioo2.
On the other hand, a state cannot be sued to recover the
amount due to holders of its bonds: Hans v. Louisiana. 134
U. S. i; S. C., io Sup. Ct. Rep. 504, affirming 24 Fed.
Rep. 55 ; nor can a suit be maintained against the auditor of
a state, to compel the levying of a special tax for the benefit
of holders of its bonds, since that is in effect a suit against
the state : North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22 ; S. C.,
io Sup. C'. Rep. 509.
Since the board of agriculture is a department of the state
government, if the state has not given its consent to be sued
through it, an action against it to recover money alleged to
have been wrongfully collected by it as a license tax cannot be
maintained: Lord & Polk Chemical Co. v. Board of Agriculture,
III N.C. 135; S. C., 15 S. E. Rep. 1032. So, too, a private
citizen cannot bring a suit against a state board to enjoin the
erection of a public building at a place other than that prescribed by law, unless his burden of taxation will be increased
thereby: Sherman v. Bellows, (Oreg.) 34 Pac. Rep. 549.
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The act of Congress of 189o, granting money in aid of
agricultural colleges established by the states, (26 Stat. at
Large, 417,) imparts a grant to the state, as a political body,
of a fund to be administered by the state; and, therefore, the
federal courts have no jurisdiction to determine the rights of
conflicting claimants to the fund, by a suit to restrain the state
treasurer from paying the money to one of them, for that is,
in effect, a suit against the state : Brown University v. Rhode
Island College of Agriculture & JMechanic Arts, 56 Fed.
Rep. 55When a state has brought a suit in equity against a defendant in one of her own courts, and the cause had been removed to the federal courts, the defendant may there file a
cross-bill against the state, as she has voluntarily submitted
herself to the jurisdiction, and the cross-bill is not an original
suit: Port Royal & A. Ry. Co. v. State of South Carolina, 6o
Fed. Rep. 552. But a cross-bill cannot be filed against a
state, under a constitutional provision, (Const. Ala. Art. i,
§ I5,) that the state shall not be made a defendant in any
court of law or equity, if it seeks affirmative relief against the
state: .Fohnes v. State, (Ala.) 14 So. Rep. 5 1. Nor can a
cross-demand be maintained against a state: State v. Gaines,
(La.) 15 So. Rep. 174.

According to the Supreme Court of Ohio, a contract which
binds a gas company to furnish to a city "such quantity of gas
as may be required by the city council for public
Contract,
Construction, lamps at two-thirds of the lowest averaged price
Price of Gas at which gas shall or may be furnished to priVate
individuals in the cities of New Orleans, Baltimore, New York,
Louisville and Pittsburgh," means that the price of the gas
shall be ascertained by taking the lowest cash price in each
city, adding these prices together, dividing the amount by
five, and then taking two-thirds of the quotient. This last
result will be the price to be paid by the city to the gas company under the contract: City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati
Gaslight & Coke Co., 41 N. E. Rep. 239.
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When a new corporation is formed by the consolidation of
two or more other corporations, and no provision is made by
Corporations, statute or by the articles of incorporation for the
Consolilation, payment of the debts and liabilities of the conTaxation

stituent corporations, the new corporation assumes

all the debts and liabilities of the constituent companies, which
follow as an incident of the consolidation ; and, under such
circumstances, such consolidated corporation is not an innocent purchaser for value of the property of its constituent
companies, so as to prevent the state from subjecting the same
to the payment of taxes thereon: Bloxham v. Florida Ccnt. &
P. R_. R. Co., (Supreme Court of Florida,) 17 So. Rep. 902.
The courts cannot be influenced in their action by objections which do not apply to the constitutionality, but only to
Courts,

Ratio
Decidendi

the policy, the justice, and the wisdom of the law

in question.

The relief from such legislation, if

the objections urged are well taken, must come

from the legislative, and not the judicial, department of the
government. The courts are bound to uphold the statutes,
unless they are clearly in conflict with the constitution : Bloxham v. Florida Cent. & P. R. R. Co., (Supreme Court of
Florida,) 17 So. Rep. 902.

This may well be commended to some courts, which act as
if their prejudices were the only criteria of the propriety of a
statute, and whose contortions in the effort to get an unconstitutional view of a case would be ridiculous, if the effects
were not so disastrous.
The Queen's Bench Division has lately rendered a very
interesting decision in regard to the liability" of the members
The
Criminal Law, of a social club under police regulations.
Betting,
Social Club

respondent was charged with an offence against
the Betting Act of 1*853, (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119,

§ i,) which enacts that " no house, office, room, or other
place shall be opened, kept, or used, for the purpose of the
owner, occupier, or keeper thereof, or any person using the
.betting with persons resorting thereto." The
same .....
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premises in question were owned and occupied by a club,
registered under the Companies' Acts. By the rules, each
member was required to hold at least one share, and disputes
as to bets were settled by a committee. Refreshments and
dinners were served in the club, and newspapers provided.
Members were in the habit of betting with each other in the
club-room, which was used exclusively by members, but no
member had any particular place allotted to him. The respondent, who was a member, made bets on the club premises
with other members. On these facts, it was held that he was
not guilty of an offence against the act: .Downes v. Johnson,
[1895] 2 Q. B. 203.
According to a recent decision of Judge PHILIPS, of the
District Court for the District of Kansas, First Division, when
a sentence different from that authorized by law
Erroneous
has been imposed on a defendant convicted of a
Sentence,
Effect of
criminal offence, and the judgment has, been
Reversal

reversed for that error, and the cause remanded
to the trial court, with. instructions to proceed therein according to law, the trial court resumes jurisdiction of the cause at
the point where the error supervened, and has authority to
resentence the defendant, and impose the penalty provided by
law, although part of the void sentence has been executed:
U S. v. Harman, 68 Fed. Rep. 472.
But the same judge has also held, in United States v.
Woodruff, 68 Fed. Rep. 536, that when a defendant was con-victed of embezzlingD moneys received by him as
Erroneous
Sentence,
assistant postmaster, and by consent of the district attorney, in view of the insolvency of the
Evectof
Autrefois
defendant, a verdict was taken upon the issue of
Convict
embezzlement alone, without any finding of the
amount embezzled, and the court sentenced the defendant to
imprisonment only, without rendering judgment, by way of
fine, for the amount embezzled, for which error the judgment
was reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings
according to law, the trial court was without authority to fix
the amount of the fine without the verdict of a jury, and as
the opinion of the appellate court established the fact that the
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two issues were inseparable, and must be tried together, the
defendant having been once in jeopardy on the issue of the
amount embezzled, must be discharged.
The Supreme Court of California has lately ruled, in Judson
v. Giant Powder Co., 4o Pac. Rep. lO2O, that a presumption of
negligence arises from the fact that an explosion
Dynamite
Explosion,

has occurred in a dynamite factory, when there is

Evidence,
Estoppel

evidence that dynamite, if carefully handled, will
not explode, and expert evidence
is admissible to

establish the latter fact; and the fact that a person sold the
land adjoining his own for a dynamite factory will not preclude him, on the maxim "volenti nonfit injuria," from suing
for injuries to his own land and the improvements thereon,
resulting from the negligent handling of an explosive necessary for the manufacture of dynamite.
When a fund is deposited with a trustee to pay a creditor,
who is free to accept or reject the benefit of the
Election,
Acceptance or trust, the fact that he prosecutes a pending suit
Rejection of against the debtor to judgment, with full knowlTrust

edge of all the circumstances, shows an election
to reject the trust: White v. White, (Supreme Court of Alabama,) 18 So. Rep. 3.
The disputes as to the validity of ballots under the Australian Ballot Laws still continue. The Ballot Act of
Wyoming, (Acts 189o, c. 8o,) provides, in § Ilo,
Elections,
Ballots
that the county clerk shall furnish a stamp with an
ink pad to the judges of election for the purpose of stamping
the official ballots; § i 19 provides that the judge who delivers
the ballot to an elector shall first mark it with this stamp, and
write his name or initials upon the back of each ballot, directly
under the official stamp ; § 122 requires the elector to fold the
ballot so that the face will be concealed, and the indorsement
may be seen; and § 130 provides that "in the canvass of the
votes any ballot which is not indorsed by the official stamp
or has not the name or initials of the judge of election as

',
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55 Z17

providedin this. act shAll be,,void hnd lsha.l'not.'beicounted."
This, last provision ;was. hld in Sla),makir v. Philli; 40IPac..
Rep. 97", by: the Supreme, Court, of,1Wkoming,: against- the,
dissent; of ,Chief 'Justice, GiROESBECK; to. ,mean 'that, bothiithe•
official stamp. .and 'thdiname or .initials. of the.judgeofelec tion 'must appear ,on the, ballot, and further, that th~y'.must.t
appear uppn.the exterior f,.the.balldt when fclded !soas;:-to.
conceal its face. The courb also held, with' thi samedi ent, ,
thht this, act 'was in ,full! ;conf6rmityvith th6. constitiiti6n sof.
W-nmirig-,Ait,6; §§ I '& 2,',giy;ing to ,certain':citizens,.,not.t
falling _within any-,of ithe classes excldded,theright, to vote;
with' § i i, which provides,.for elections bka secret, ballbt and.'
enacts that, onl' the official ballots -shall;!be,_ received,:andI
3, whichtimppses uppmthe, legislature.,
counted; and vithl§ '-I
tht, dtity, ofpassing Jlaws to, secure ,the.pprityr, of ;elections.Accordifig to a recenb~decision of,'the, Court of :Appeal: off
'woman, has separate,'
Hisbandand England,' wh'n,,a,married
property subject to a,restraint, on, anticipatin,th!,
Wife,
Separate
restraint applies to-income, which, has becomedUe,
Property,
Restraint on

Antcpaton,
Ekecution"

but has not" yet been paid to her, and thberefore,.
such' income cannottbe fnadd availablein execu -

tion upon a judgment against her, even. although
ithad :accrued due at the date of the judgment, Lf ius v.
Heriot, [1895] i2,Q.' 3.' 2.12
Butler v. Ellerbe,
The Supreme Court'of South Carolina,, ifi
92'S. E. Rep.' 425, has neatly evaded the question. as-to the
ijunction

constitutionality of the Registration acts of,that

Against
State
Officer,
RSstralnng

state, one of which, passed iA 1882, (Gen. Stat.
1882, § 90, &c.,) provided :that'in.1882 aregiftra-

Disposition, of
Public Funds

tion 'of'voters should be made, and the registration,
books closed, thatthereaftersuch books should be.

open 'once.a month -after.the general 'elction in, each-year, until
the first of' j.rl, preceding each general 'election (usuallWr held'
in N~vemberl) for' the registration ofpersons thereafter becoming entitled to 'vote;, that, after, the closing of' the' books ii,
each year, persons coming of age before the election might:be
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registered ; and that, upon the registration of any voter, a certificate of registration should be given him, without the produ.:tion of which he should not be allowed to vote, and which,
upon removal from one county to another, must be transferred and renewed under onerous conditions; the other of
which statutes, passed in 1894, providing for the election of
members of a constitutional convention, also provided that a
person not registered in 1882, or at a subsequent time when
he would have a right to register, might register within a
certain time, upon making affidavit, supported by that of two
respectable citizens, as to various particulars of his occupation
and residence at the time he might have registered and
thereafter. It was attemptd to raise the question by a proceeding to restrain the comptroller-general and treasurer of
the state from disbursing funds for the payment of the officers
under those acts, on the ground that they were unconstitutional, and that the payment of the said funds was therefore
unlawful, and would cause an irreparable injury to the petitioner, a citizen and resident taxpayer of the state. But the
majority of the court cleverly dodged this issue, although on
different grounds. Mr. Justice GARY held that the proceeding
was in effect a suit against the state, to which the state was an
indispensable party, and which therefore could not be maintained without its consent. But with this view both Chief
Justice MCIVER and Justice POPE differed.

Justices

GARY

and POPE, however, agreed, against the dissent of Chief Justice McIvER, that the action could not be maintained, the
former holding (I) That the proceeding did not necessarily
involve the determination of the constitutionality of the registration act, and therefore that question could not properly be
passed upon, and (2) That an injunction would not lie to
restrain the state officers from paying the salaries in question,
on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the registration
act, because the state, if it could be sued, would be estopped
from interposing the objection that the services rendered at
her instance and for her benefit were illegal: Justice POPE
maintaining (i) That a petition for an injunction to restrain
state officers from disbursing public funds pursuant to an act
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of the legislature appropriating moneys for the payment of
salaries to the supervisors of registration and other election
officers appointed under the registration act, on the ground
that that act was an unconstitutional abridgment of the elective
franchise, but which fails to allege that any one has been
deprived of his right to vote by reason of said act, presents a
purely abstract proposition of law, which it is not the duty of
a court of equity to decide; and (2) That such an injunction
would not lie, because the petitioner had an adequate remedy
at law. From all these propositions, Chief Justice MCIVER
dissented, holding, and rightly, (I) That an injunction will lie
at the suit of a taxpayer to enjoin the illegal disposition of
state funds arising from taxation: (2) That one who has been
elected to office by the general assembly, whose members
were elected under the registration act, is not estopped to
institute an action, as a taxpayer, assailing the constitutionality
of that act: (3) That when the purport and effect of a registration law is to add to or take away any of the qualifications
prescribed by the constitution, or when its effect is to obstruct,
subvert, or even unnecessarily to impede the exercise of the
right conferred by the constitution, it cannot be sustained/but
must be held an unconstitutional invasion of the right .of
suffrage; (4) That the Registration Act of South Carolina of
1882, (Gen. Stat. S. Car. 1882, tit. 2, c. 7 ; Rev. Stat. S. Car.
13 9 3; tit. 2, c. 8) is an unconstitutional limitation of theright

of suffrage; and (5) That the. petitioner has no adequate
remedy at law.
These acts, however. have been held unconstitutional by
the United States Circuit Court, in fills v. Green, 67 Fed.
Rep. 818. See 2 A.i. L. REG. & REv. (N. S.), 486.

The Supreme Court of New York, Fifth Department, in
Sneck v. Travellers' Ins. Co., of Hartford,34 N. Y. Suppl., 545,
has overruled its former decision in the same case,
Insurance,
Accident,
30 N. Y. Suppl. 881, and now holds that in an
Total Loss action on an accident insurance policy, when
the
and
the
head
of
all
plaintiff's surgeon testified that the fingers
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the metacarpal lines of the injured hand were cut off, that a
little over half the hand, anatomically speaking, was gone,
that thirteen of the twenty-seven bones of the hand were
entirely gone, and parts of five more, and that the portion of
the hand remaining was more useful than if the amputation
had been at the wrist, but that he had no use of it as a hand;
and the plaintiff, who on the first trial testified that lie could
use the injured hand for certain purposes, testified on the
second trial that he had no use of the injured member as a
hand, and explained his testimony on the former trial by
stating that he meant that he had the use of the whole arm,
not the use of the hand ;-that on such evidence the plaintiff
had lost his entire hand, within the meaning of the policy.
See 2 Am. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 86.
The nature of the bond of inderinity given by a fidelity
insurance company to ensure the proper performance of the
duties of an officer in a position of trust, has
Fidelity
recently been very fully examined by the Circuit
Insurance
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, in Hechanics'
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Guarantee Co. of North America,
68 Fed. Rep. 459. Such a bond, the court holds, is analogous to an ordinary policy of insurance, and is governed by
the same principles of interpretation; and accordingly (I) When
a bond issued by a fidelity insurance company provides that
the answers made by the employer to questions asked in the
application shall be warranties, and the answers are made on
the employer's " best knowledge and belief," mere falsity of
the answers is not sufficient to avoid the bond, but the company must show that they were "knowingly false;" (2) When,
in an application to a fidelity insurance company for a cashier's
bond, the bank in answer to a question, stated that there had
never been a default in the position of cashier, a controversy
between the bank and a former cashier about certain commissions made by the latter, which he thought was an individual
matter, while the bank thought he should account for it, as his
time was paid for by the bank, was not a default within the
terms of the contract; (3) That a printed condition in a bank
teller's bond issued by a fidelity insurance company, requiring
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inspection of his accounts at least once a year, is satisfied by
a quarterly examination required by the contract as actually
agreed on and written out at the time of executing the bond;
(4)That when a bank teller's bond issued by a fidelity insurance company required the bank to " observe all due and customary supervision over said employe for the prevention of
default, and the only supervision expressly agreed on was a
quarterly examination of the books and accounts as regularly
made by the bank on its own account, and a report of any
known speculations on the part of the teller, an examination
in good faith, such as was customary, and such as the committee appointed deemed sufficient for the protection of the
bank and its stockholders, was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the bond, though it was somewhat loose and careless;
and (5)That when a bank teller's bond required the bank, on
becoming aware of the employe being engaged in speculation,
to report the fact to the surety, and the bank hearing of speculation by the teller, on investigation found that he had once
contributed two hundred dollars toward the formation of a
brokerage association, but, becoming dissatisfied, had sold out,
the failure to disclose the result of the inquiry would not, in
the absence of bad faith, invalidate the bond.
When a bond of indemnity recited that the association of
which the officer was treasurer had delivered to the surety
company certain statements relative to the duties and accounts
of the treasurer, which it was agreed should form the basis of
the contract in it, it was held that if such statements involved
no misrepresentation or concealment, the contract could not
be affected by loose parol statements, or concealment of facts
about which no inquiry was made, or conduct on which no
reliance was placed; nor by conversations as to laws of the
association with its vice-president, at the time of application for
the bond, as it did not appear that he had authority to make
any representations on the subject; nor by the fact that at the
time of such application the treasurer was in default to the
association, there being no representation to the contrary in
the statements delivered, and nothing to show that at that
time the fact was known to any officer of the association:
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Supreme Council Catholic Knights of Ameica v. Fidcli , &
Casualty Co. of New York, 63 Fed. Rep. 48.
The Queen's Bench Division, in a case tried before
MATHEW, J., without a jury, Asfar v. Blundell, [18951 2
Q. B. 196, has recently decided some questions of
Marine
Insurance,
considerable importance with respect to marine
Profit on
Charter,
Total Loss

insurance. A ship having been chartered for a
lump sum, the charterers put her up as a general

ship, and goods were shipped on board under bills of lading,
at freights, payable on right delivery, which in the aggregate
exceeded the charter freight. The charterers then insured
their " profit on charter " by a policy which contained a warranty against average. On the arrival of the ship, part of the
cargo was delivered, and freight was accordingly payable
tinder the bill of lading for that portion; but the residue,
-owing to sea danage, was in an unmerchantable condition,
and freight was, therefore, not payable for it; the result being
that the total amount of the freights payable under the bills
of lading was less than the charter freight, and the charterer's
profit was consequently lost. Under these circumstances, it
was held that there had been a total loss of the subject-matter
of the insurance within the meaning of the warranty; and
that the fact that the charter freight was a lump sum and not
a tonnage rate could not avail the defendants, since it was not
one which the assured were bound to disclose, the underwriters
being put upon inquiry to ascertain the terms of the charter,
the profit on which they purported to insure.
The court just mentioned has also recently decided a very
interesting case under the Licensing Act of 1872, (35 & 36
Intoxicating Vict. c. 94, § 3.) A brewer, who had a license
Liquors,
for the sale of beer by retail, at a specified place,
Sale
such beer to be consumed off the premises, was in
the habit of sending round his cart containing jars of beer to
houses in the neighborhood; the jars of beer were delivered
from the cart at the customers' houses in pursuance of orders
given by the customers at their houses to the carter in the
previous week, the price being paid by the customer to the
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carter in the week succeeding delivery. There was no mark
on label upon the jars to show that any particular jar had
been appropriated to any particular customer; and the court
held that the sale of the beer must be taken to have been at
the house of the customer and not at the licensed premises,
and that the brewer was properly convicted of selling intoxicating liquor at a place where he was not authorized by his
license to sell: Plet/s v. Campbell, [1895] 2 Q. B. 229.
According to a late ruling of the Supreme Court of Alabama, the disqualifications declared by the Code of that state,
Justice of the § 647, which provides that no justice "must sit in
Peace,
any cause or proceeding in which he is ....
Disqualifi.
cation,
Relationship

-

related to either party within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity," are not exclusive of the

disqualifications of the common law; and, therefore, a justice
of the peace who married a first cousin of the defendant is
incompetent to try the cause, when there are children of the
marriage surviving, though the wife is dead: Pegues v. Baker,
17 So. Rep. 943.
A communication relating to state matters made by one
officer of state to another in the course of his official duty is
absolutely privileged, and cannot be made the
subject of an action for libel : Chatterton v. SecrePrivileged
Comrnnica- tai) of Statefor India in Council, (Court of Appeal
lion
of England,) [1895] 2
Q. B. I89.
The libel complained of in this case was made by the Secretary of State for India to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
for India in order to enable him to answer a question asked
in the House of Commons with regard to the treatment of the
plaintiff, an officer in the Indian Staff Corps, by the Indian
military authorities and Government, and stated that the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Government of India, in a
dispatch in the secretary's possession, recommended the
removal of the plaintiff to the half-pay list as an officer whose
retention on the effective list was in every way most undesirable. This statement the plaintiff alleged to be false.
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Communications made by one officer to another, in the discharge of his duty, are privileged: Pittardv. Oliver, 63 L. T.
N. S. 247; and an action for libel will not lie against the
members of an investigating committee* appointed by a town
with which the plaintiff had a written contract, for defamatory
matter contained in a printed report made by them to the
town; for in making the report the committee is performing
a duty imposed upon it, and is communicating to the voters
and taxpayers of the town the results of. an investigation in
which they have an interest, and which they have the right to
know and act upon, and the occasion is such as to protect the
committee from a liability for such statements contained in the
report as are made in good faith, without malice, and with
reasonable cause to believe them true, and which do not go
beyond what is fairly required of them in the discharge of
their duty: Howland v. Flood, i6o Mass. 509; S. C., 36 N.
E. Rep. 482. The same is true of any investigating committee: its report will not be actionable, without proof of
express malice : In re The Invcstzgating Comnission. 16
R. I. 751.
The regulation of pawnbrokers, junk dealers, and dealers in
second-hand goods, is within the police power, and an ordinance requiring such dealers to take out a license,
Licenses,
Junk Dealers under certain restrictions, is not unreasonable,
merely because it requires them to give a bond in addition to
the payment of the license fee, provides that they shall keep
a record of their purchases and sales, and to furnish a statement thereof to the police department, requires that their applications for license be signed by twelve fieeholders certifying
to the good character and reputation of the applicant, prohibits
them from purchasing from boys, intoxicated persons, or
habitual drunkards, and provides as a condition precedent to
the issue of a license that the applicant shall agree that his
license may be revoked at the will of the city council: City of
Grand Rapids v. Brandy, (Supreme Court of Michigan,) 64
N. W. Rep. 29. A similar statute, requiring pawnbrokers to
keep a record of things pawned, and submit to the inspection
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of the police officials, on demand, was held - constitutional by
the Supreme Court of Missouri, in City of St. Joseph v. Levin,
31 S. W. Rep. IOI. See 2 A-i. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 439.

2

The Court of Appeal of England, in Robb v. Green, [1895]
HAWKINS, J., in
Master and Robb v. Green, [1895] 2 Q. B. i, (See 2 A3i. L.
REG. & REV. (N. S.) 497,) that it is an implied
Servant,
Improper
term of the contract of service that the servant
Use of
Information will observe good faith towards his master during

Q. B. 315, has affirmed the judgment of

Obtained
during

the existence of the confidential relation between
them; and that when one who is employed as
manager of his employer's business surreptitiously copies from
his master's order-book a list of the names and addresses of
the customers, with the intention of using it for the purpose
of soliciting orders from them after he had left the plaintiff's
service and set up a similar business on his own account, and
does so use the list after the termination of the service, his
conduct is a breach of that implied contract, and entitles the
master to damages and an injunction against the use of the
list.
Service

The Supreme Court of New Jersey has just declared constitutional a statute passed by the legislature of that state
Naturalization, during its last session, for the purpose of protecting the franchise from ignorant and unworthy
Regulation,
State Laws
foreigners, who have hitherto often been naturalized immediately preceding election in large blocks, thlrough
the instrumentality of party committees.
One of the provisions of the law denies to party committees or candidates the right to pay the fees of applicants for
naturalization papers. Another provides that "no person shall
hereafter be naturalized or admitted to be a citizen of the
state within the net thirty days preceding any national, state,
municipal, general, special, local or charter election."
It was on this provision that the constitutionality of the law
was attacked and the opinion rendered. It was held that the
state could not abridge the right of the would-be citizen to
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secure his papers at any time. The opinion of the .court was
delivered by Justice VA. SYCKEL, who, with Justice LippixCOTf, sat in thc case. The proceeding was on mandamus,
bro'ught by Senator Daly on behalf of one Albert Rushworth,
who was denied naturalization papers by the Hudson County
Court of Common Pleas. The refusal by the Hudson County
court was on the sole ground that Rushworth had made his
application within thirty days next preceding the election of
municipal officers in West Hoboken. Judge VAN SYCKEL says:
It is entirely settled that no state can pass naturalization
laws. The United States statute provides for the naturalization of aliens by application to a Circuit or District Court of
the United States, or a District Court or Supreme Court or
Court of record of any of the states having common law
jurisdiction and a seal and clerk. The United States government has thus selected the state courts as one of its agencies
to bear and act upon applications for naturalization.
"The solution of the controversy in this case, in my judgment, turns upon the question whether the state may not
regulate the order of business in its own courts in relation to
this subject, or refuse altogether to permit its courts to entertain applications for naturalization.
"Whether the judges of the state courts shall act on applications for naturalization or execute any other like authority,
with which they may be lawfully invested, is, in my opinion,
exclusively within, and subject to, the will of the legislative
branch of the state government.
My conclusion is that it is competent for the state legislature to forbid state courts altogether to entertain or act upon
applications for naturalization, and, therefore, it can lay any
restraint, regulation, limitation or condition upon the practice
in such cases, which it may deem expedient or proper.
"No right is claimed or could be conceded on behalf of the
state to interfere in any respect with the subject of naturalization in the Federal courts. This in no wis6 impairs the exclusive power of the United States over the subject of naturalization. The power of Congress to create inferior courts and
such other agencies as it may deem necessary for the com-
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plete exercise of this branch of its exclusive authority is not
circumscribed."
In Philadelphia, by rule of court, the Common Pleas will
only hear applications for naturalization between the first day
of each December and the first day of the following July.
(Rule XXVII., § 1192.)

The Supreme Court of Louisiana has adopted the prevalent
doctrine on the imputation of contributory negligence, holding,
in Perez v. New Orleans City & Lake R. R. Co.,
Negligence,
17 So. Rep. 869, that a passenger in a tally-ho,
Imptsted
hired with a driver from the proprietors of a livery stable, is
not so far identified with the driver as to be responsible for his
acts, and chargeable with his contributory negligence, so as to
exonerate a third person whose concurrent negligence causes
an injury to the passenger, unless the passenger undertakes
the management and direction of the driver in some manner
outside of merely indicating the route he is to travel and the
destination to which he wishes to be taken; and the passenger
is not himself guilty of contributor), negligence because of a
failure to advise the driver in regard to his manner of driving.

The pardon of one convicted of perjury will, in the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, remove the
disability to testify created by the acts of that
Pardon,
state of i86o, March 31 ; P. L. 382, § 14, which
Effect
provides that any one convicted of that offence "shall be forever
disqualifie d from being a witness in any matter in controversy,"
and 1887, May 23 ; P. L. 158, § 5, which provides that such
person -shall not be a competent witness for an), purpose,
though his sentence may have been fully complied with,
"unless the judgment of conviction be judicially set aside or
reversed :" Die/l v. Rodgers, 32 Ati. Rep. 424.

The litigation over the validity of the Berliner telephone
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patent has been decided, on appeal, in favor of the Bell TelePatents,

Dely in
Issuing,
Fraud

phone Company, by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
First Circuit, in American Bell Telephone Co. v.
United States, 68 Fed. Rep. 542, reversing 65 Fed.

Rep. 86. The ground on which it was sought to
cancel the Berliner patent was the delay in procuring its
issuance, which was alleged to have been illegal. This point,
in connection with the evidence adduced, was very carefully
examined by the Court of Appeals, and the following conclusions, fatal to the success of the bill, were arrived at: (I) If
an applicant is under no legal obligation to prevent delays
arising from the acts or omissions of the officials of the patent
cffice, there is no rule of law by which it can be said that,
because he may have received an incidental benefit therefrom
in the prolongation of his monopoly, his purpose in not more
vigorously pressing his application was unlawful; since the
motive will not make an act wrongful, if it is not in itself
wrongful; (2) That there is no rule of diligence which requires
an applicant, on pain of forfeiting his rights, to do, in the
interest of the public, all the things which he has a right to
do, in his own interest, for the purpose of pressing his application to a speedy issue; (3) That when a bill is filed to
cancel a patent on the ground that the patentee acquiesced
in delays of the patent office whereby his monopoly was; in
effect, prolonged, it is not for the court to say, under the circumstances of the case in hand, that he was not entitled to
use his own judgment in regard to what unofficial methods he
might take, or the persistency of his representations to the
public officials for the purpose of speeding his application;
(4)-That the existence of an understanding between the patent
office officials and an applicant that further action should
abide the result of certain litigation involving the applicant's
rights is no ground for forfeiting a patent subsequently
granted, though the delay in effect operated to prolong the
patentee's monopoly, when that understanding was the result
of the honest and independent judgment of both parties that
this course was, on the whole, the best, and consisted in
nothing more than an interchange of these views; (5) That
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an error of judgment on the part of the commissioner in delaying action upon an application pending certain litigation which
involved the applicant's rights, and the acquiescence of the
applicant in such delay, is no ground for forfeiting the patent
when issued; (6) That if even it were true that, by reason of
the special circumstances of this case, the applicant was under
an extraordinary duty to the public to exercise the greatest
possible diligence to move the officials of the patent office to
-speedy action, yet the burden rested upon the United States
to prove that under some practical method or methods, not
employed by the patentee, the action of the patent office would
have been hastened; (7) That a patent should not be canceled merely upon the ground of imputed or legal fraud
arising from the delay of the patent office, acquiesced in by
the applicant, when there has been no deceit, collusion, or
corruption ; and (8) That the issuance of a second patent to
the same person for the same invention, under circumstances
such that it is not clearly manifest that the inventions are the
same, and that there might be a reasonable difference "of
opinion on the question of identity, does not involve such an
excess of power on the part of the commissioner as will justify
a court of equity in canceling the second patent.
According to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,
one who makes regular periodical trips through certain towns,
as agent for a wholesale confectioner, with a wagon
_
Peddlers
loaded with packages of candy, calling on retail
dealers only, taking orders and filling them from the Wagon
if he can, if not, booking them to be filled by a subsequent
delivery, is not a peddler, within the meaning of Pub. Acts
Conn. 1893, May I8, c. 121, p. 271, entitled "An act concerning sales of merchandise by itinerant peddlers," which provides for licensing persons to engage in the business of an
auctioneer, peddler, or hawker, or as a traveling itinerant purchaser of second-hand goods: State v. Fetterer, 32 Atl. Rep.
394A peddler, in the popular signification of the word, is "a
small retail dealer, who, carrying his merchandise with him,
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travels from house to house, or from place to place, either on
foot or on horse-back, or in a vehicle drawn by one or more
animals, exposing his goods for sale, and selling them:"
Randolp11 v. Yellowstone Kit, 83 Ala. 474. "The distinctive
feature does not consist in the mode of transportation. though
one of the statutory modes is essential to constitute a peddler,
but in the fact that a peddler goes from house to house, or
place to place, carrying his articles of merchandisewith him,and
concurrently sells and delivers :" Ballou v. State, 87 Ala. I44.
"The dominant idea involved in such an occupation seems to
be that the individual carries his stock in trade, consisting of
small wares, on foot, or in a vehicle, about the country, offering them for sale, and then and there selling them:" Stamford v. Fisher, 14o N. Y. 187; S. C., 35 N. E. Rep. 500,
affirming 63 Hun, 163 ; S. C., 17 N. Y. Suppl. 6o9. There
are, therefore, four elements required to constitute a peddler:
First, that he should have no fixed place of dealing, but
should travel around from place to place; Second, that he
should carry with him the wares that he offers for sale, not
merely samples thereof; Third, that he should sell them at
the time when he offers them, not simply enter into an executory contract for future sale; and Fourth, that he should
deliver them -then and there, not merely contract to deliver
them in the future. If any one of these elements is constantly absent from the regular dealings of the vendor, he is
not a peddler, whatever else he may be. Accordingly, no
one who merely solicits orders for future delivery, or sells by
sample, whether a dealer, or simply the agent of a dealer, can
be considered as a peddler.
i. A storekeeper, who solicits orders and delivers groceries
pursuant to such orders, but does not sell or offer for sale any
goods directly from his delivery wagon, is not a peddler:
Stamford v. Fisher, 14o N. Y. 187; S. C., 35 N. E. Rep.
5oo, affirming 63 Hun, 163; S. C., 17 N. Y. Suppl. 6o9;

Commonwealth v. Horn, 12
tailor, who exhibits samples
suits of clothing to be made
manufacturer, not a peddler :

Pa. C. C. 284. A merchant
of cloth and takes orders for
and delivered afterwards, is a
Radebauglh v. Villag-e of Plain
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Cit) 28 Wkly L. Bull. 107; and no merchant vho has ah
established place of business, and simply takes orders to be
filled at that place and delivered from there, is within the
definition: Commofiwealth v. EFichenberg 14o Pa. 158; S. Ct
21

Atil. Rep. 258.

One who sells ranges, &c,, by sample, and by taikiig
orders for goods to be thereafter delivered and paid for, is Hot
a peddler: State v. Lee, ti 3 N. C. 681 ; S. C., 18 S. E. Rep.
713. When the defendant went from house to house displaying samples carried with him in a case, and taking orders folhis firm, and the firn, if it approved the orders, shipped the
goods to the defendant, who delivered them, and took the
cash payment, with an obligation to the firm for the balance,
which was collected by the firm, it was held that the defendant was not a peddler within the statute: State v. Hioffman,
50 Mo. App. 585 ; In re Flin, 57 Fed. Rep. 496 , Olnej, v.
Todd, 47 Ill. App. 439. Canvassing or taking orders for
books, pictures, &c., is not peddling or hawking: Cerro Gordo
v, Ravlings, 135 Ill. 36; S. C., 25 N. E. Rep. ioo6i affirming
32 Ill. App. 215 ; Emmnons v. Lewistoz-,n, 132 Ill. 380; S. C.,
24 N. E. Rep. 58. The driver of a delivery wagon, who simply
takes orders for future delivery, and then delivers the goods
previously ordered, is not a peddler: Hesuson v. Inhabitantsof
Township of Eng/ewood, 55 N. J. L. 522; S. C., 27 Ati., Rep.
2.

904. Nor is one who merely delivers goods previously sold
by another: city of Stuart v. Cinuzinglham, 88 Iowa, 191;
S..C., 55 N. W. Rep. 311. The only recent case in contradiction of these views is Spanist Fork City v. Mortensen,
7 Utah, 33, whith is without weight, so far as this point is
concerned.
3. But if the vendor does travel from place to place, selling
his goods and delivering them on the spot, he is a peddler;
and as the sale takes place wholly within the limits of the
state, he cannot claim that he is engaged in interstate commerce: Comnmonwealth v. Gardner, 133 Pa. 284. Whern the
evidence showed that the defendants, who were butchers, and
kept a meat-shop, sent out a delivery wagon in charge of an
employer with meat to be delivered to fill orders previously
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given by their customers, but at the same time were accustomed to send out in the wagon other meat, with knives for
cutting it, and scales for weighing it, and that the employe in
charge of the wagon was accustomed to drive from place to
place soliciting business, not only from the wagon, but by
going from house to house when the inmates did not see him
and come out to the street, and selling to such as desired to
buy from him, cutting up the meat, and weighing it out firom
the wagon, it was held that this constitutea peddling in the
employers: CiO, of Diuth v. Kr2tpp, 46 Minn. 435 ; S. C., 49
N. W. Rep. 235. So, a manufacturer of and dealer in proprietary medicines, who has a permanent manufactorv and
residence in one county, upon which he pays taxes, but who,
during certain seasons of the y"ear, attends the county fairs for
the purpose of advertising and introducing his medicines, and
publicly recommends them as a cure for certain diseases, is an
itinerant vendor: Sin'der v. Closson, 84 Iowa, 184; State v.
Gouss, 85 Iowa, 21.

The Supreme Court of California, in Labs v. Cooper, 40
Pac. Rep. 1042, has lately held, that in a proceeding to collect
assessments for street improvements, a recorded
Public
improve-

ments,
Assessment,
Diagram

diagram, in which there is nothing to indicate the
g
n

points of the compass, whereby an owner could
determine, froirn an inspection of the diagram and

assessment, where on the map his land was plotted, will not
be sufficient to create a lien ; and the fact that the lot may be
identified by reference to the official map of the city will not
cure the defect, when there is nothing in the record of the
assessment referring to that map, since the court will not take
judicial notice of the map, and the property owner is not
chargeable with knowledge of it.
Judge THAYER, of Philadelphia, has recently rebuked the
officiousness of the worthy gentlemen who would have prevented the city from sending the Liberty Bell to
Relics,
Municipal
the Atlanta Exposition, denying the injunction
control,

Liberty Bell

prayed for, and dismissing the bill, The most
pointed part of his opinion is as follows :
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"Independence Bell, or 'the Liberty Bell,' as it is commonly called from its revolutionary associations and the
unconscious prophecy placed upon it when it Wyas made,
is the property of the city of Philadelphia, which acquired
its title to it by a sale made by the Commonwealth in
1816 of the State House and al! its gropnds, bpildings and
"appurtenances, including the bell, furipture and all other
property belonging to the StateHouse, the whole being purchased by the city for the sum of $70,000.
"The property of the city of Philadelphia in the Liberty
Bell is as absolute and as untrammeled by conditions as is the
title by which any individual holds his personal property, It
is the property of the corporation, and entirely under its control-as much so as the equipments of the courts, or the
furniture of the Council chambers. It has been said that the
city is a trustee and holds the bell as trustee for the citizens of
Philadelphia, and this is true in a certain sense; indeed in the
same sense the city may be said to be a trustee for all the
people of the United States, for it is a moral duty which it owes
to the'whole country to take care of and guard s1fely a relic
of so much interest tq all the people of the United States.
But this is not such a trust as trammels or interferes in any
way with its absolute ownership of the bell. It may not make
an unlawful or fraudulent use of it, and against such a use a
court of equity might enjoin it. But to warrant such an
interference the use must plainly appear to be a fraudulent or
unlawful use. City Councils might be enjoined from renting:
a room in the City Hall for a cow stable, for that would plinly
be an unlawful use of the property. So they might, in a plain
case, be enjoined, I apprehend, from making an unlawful disposition of the bell.
"But can the sending of the bell under proper conditions,
and properly attended and guarded, as a Pennsylvania exhibit,
to the Atlanta Exposition, be regarded in any sense as an
unlawful or fraudulent act ?-I use the word fraudulent in the
sense of misapplication or misuse of public property.-In my
judgment it is preposterous to say so. The exposition at
Atlanta is an event of great importance, not only to our
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brethren in Georgia and the South, but to the whole country.
It was regarded by the Legislature of Pennsylvania of so much
importance that at its recent session it appointed commissioners, and appropriated the sum of $38,000 to defray the
expense of the Pennsylvania exhibit there. It will be participated in by most, if not all, the states, and it will be an event
which can not but advance the interests of our common
country, and draw closer and closer those bonds of fraternal
union between the different states, which are so generally the
offspring of extensive commercial intercourse.
" But this is not a question for the exercise of our discretion nor the discretion of any court, but for the discretion of
the city of Philadelphia, the owner of the bell. So long as
the disposition proposed to be made of it is not manifestly
illegal, it is a matter absolutely within the discretion of the
City Councils; and that the proposed use is not illegal I
entertain no doubt whatever."
When several persons are nominated by the governor and
confirmed by the senate as members of the board of trustees
of state charitable institutions, and the terms of
State
Institutions, the offices to be filled by the said appointment are
not of the same duration, and do not begin and
Trustees,
Term of Office

end at the same time, if the nominating message
to the senate is indefinite and ambiguous as to the tenure and
succession of the appointees, and does not show when the
term of each appointee is intended to begin and end, the
records in the qffices of the governor and secretary of state in
regard to such appointments, as well as the commissions issued
to and accepted by the appointees, are competent evidence in
determining the succession and terms of those appointed: Lease
v. Clark (Supreme Court of Kansas),.40 Pac. Rep, 1002.
The Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, in
U zited States Graphite Co. v. Pacific Graphzite Co., 68 Fed.
Rep. 442, has recently extended the rule that an
Writs,

Service,
Officer of

orporation

officer of a foreign corporation temporarily within

the jurisdiction for purposes not connected with
the business of the corporation, cannot be validly
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served with process, and has held, that service of process made
upon an officer of a foreign corporation, casually in the state
where the service is made, but where such corporation has no
place of business or agency, will' not confer jurisdiction,
although the officer was at the time engaged upon business
of the corporation. This nullifies the decision of the state
court in Shickle, H. & H. Iron Co. v. Wiley Const. Ca,,
6I Mich. 226; S. C., 28 N. W. Rep. 77, where it was held
that if the officer of the foreign corporation is within the
jurisdiction, and served there, such service is valid to bind the
corporation and subject it to the jurisdiction of the court, and
the defense that the officer served was not on the business of
the corporation cannot avail the defendant, so far as the extraterritorial effect of a judgment obtained on such service is
concerned.
The rule mentioned above, that in a personal action against
a foreign corporation, neither doing business within the state,
nor having an agent or property therein, the service of a
summons on its president, while temporarily within the jurisdiction, is not a sufficient service on the corporation, was
announced by the Supreme Court of the United States, in
Goldey v. Aforning ANws, 156 U. S. 518; S. C., 15 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 559, affirming 42 Fed. Rep. 112. The same was also
held in Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co. v. Mobile St. Ry. Co.,
53 Fed. Rep. 85o. The contrary was decided in Gravely v.
Southern Ice Machine Co., (La.), 16 So. Rep. 866.

